The human brain, an organic system comprised of millions of nerve endings firing at a fraction of a second. On a physical level, it is responsible for monitoring and triggering all primary functions in the body; breathing, walking, and balance, all of these actions take place without requiring any thought thanks to the brain. However, there are two sides to this complicated cranial coin. Sigmund Feud once said, “the mind is like an iceberg, it floats with one-seventh of its bulk above the water.” The mind is so complex humanity has yet to fully understand it to a degree, which would enable us to actualize its full potential. But what is its full potential? How far into our environment can our minds reach, if they are capable of breaching our physical bodies at all? This question is essential when contemplating what has been designated “the extended mind theory” and the answers are not given up so easily. The theory’s functionality and existence has been debated amid the brightest in the philosophical and scientific communities alike for centuries with no consensus. The reason being there is no definitive answer as to what the extended mind is. One hypothesis is the extended mind can include, and not solely be aided by external stimuli. Meaning when a coupling between the mind and an object in an environment takes place, the object can be considered part of an individual’s cognitive processes. Most speculate cognitive processes only take place between a unification of body and mind. The extended mind theory adds a third aspect to the mix, allowing cognition to take place between body, mind, and an object in one’s environment, however to do so the object must fit a certain criteria. Fortunately this specific criteria has been elucidated by Andy Clark in his article Memento’s Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended.
Clark claims that for an inanimate object to be considered part of an individual’s cognitive system it must, “ be reliably available, typically invoked and be easily accessible as and when required.” Additionally Clark believes, “any information retrieved from the object must be more or less automatically endorsed and not subject to critical scrutiny by others.” Meaning the information should be as Clark puts it, “deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved from biological memory.” (Clark 46) Our biological memory never leaves our side; therefore if an object functions in the same manner, it should be considered to be part of one’s extended mind.
This criterion seems reasonable enough, however the idea of accepting an external object as a part of an individual’s cognitive system is still scoffed at. I think this can potentially be attributed to a critic’s subjective view of the world, an inability to see that not all individuals can rely on the legitimacy of the information stored in their biological memories. The majority of individuals don’t need to rely on external resources to help them recall information; however there are people for which this is a necessity. The character Leonard in Christopher Nolan’s film, Memento is a prime example. Having suffered an extreme case of amnesia, Leonard is unable to retain any information; therefore he is forced to rely on external resources. The pictures he takes, the notes he writes to himself, and his body tattoos are all used to replace the functions of an average person’s biological memory. Who’s to say this system shouldn’t count as part of Leonard’s cognitive processes? He fully endorses what has been written down and captured in the photographs the same way any individual would endorse a belief retrieved from their own biological memory or mind. Should we discredit what Leonard claims to know simply because it comes from an external as opposed to an internal source? There are many who would say, “yes.” However, I disagree.
Let us examine the example Clark uses in Memento’s Revenge, the case study of Otto and Inga. First, we have Inga. Inga represents an individual with an average cognitive system; she is capable of storing and retrieving information and endorsing said information without using anything outside of her natural biological memory. For example Inga can look at an address, retain it and then call upon it later without any trouble. Once she has retained the address she can say with confidence the location of the selected establishment because she believes the information to be true and reliable.
In contrast, there is Otto. Otto, unlike Inga, has no natural aptitude for memory and represents an individual with a cognitive system that utilizes the extended mind theory. He isn’t capable of retaining information, therefore he carries a notebook with him at all times. This notebook allows Otto to record any significant information and call upon it when necessary. For example, he sees the same address as Inga, immediately writes it down in his notebook, and then references the notebook when the address is needed again. Upon referencing the notebook, Otto, like Inga, can state with confidence the address of said establishment. Otto believes the information in his notebook is reliable in the same way Inga trusts in the information stored in her memory.
Now one might dispute Otto’s case by saying, “I have an address book at home which I reference frequently as well! I don’t consider it to be an extension of my cognitive system.” That is a reasonable argument; however in Otto’s situation there is one major difference. Usually when an individual refers to an external object such as an address book the following cognitive process takes place: you desire the information, you consciously think about the information in the external object, and then you reference the object to retrieve said information. In Otto’s case he desires the information, then without thinking consults the notebook. Otto doesn’t consciously think about the information being located in his notebook; consulting the notebook is simply second nature. He relies so heavily on it and uses it so frequently that the act of referencing it has become instinctual. When Inga seeks information from her memory the cognitive process is identical to Otto’s. She desires the information and then without thinking she consults her memory.
The only difference between the two is the time in which the actions takes place. When Inga consults her memory it takes a fraction of a second because it is an internal process. Conversely, Otto’s action takes place externally, meaning the process requires more time. However time is not the important factor in this situation. Functionality is what requires our attention. Both actions take place without demanding any thought. If we were to take Inga’s memory and Otto’s notebook and look at each through the eyes of a functionalist, meaning purely for what they accomplish, the actions would be identical. By these standards Otto’s notebook should be accepted as an extension of his cognitive system and a great example of an extended mind. Nevertheless according to Clark’s criteria, Otto’s notebook starts the race strongly, but doesn’t quite make it to the finish line.
Otto’s notebook meets most of the requirements necessary to be considered part of an extended mind. The information Otto pulls from his notebook is endorsed without hesitation, meaning he trusts its accuracy absolutely and since Otto’s only means of recollection is the notebook we can state without a doubt that it is, as Clark puts it, “typically invoked.” The only condition that draws speculation is whether or not Otto’s notebook is “easily accessible as and when required.” As long as Otto can ensure his notebook remains at his side, the condition can be met. However, this is a difficult task to achieve. As everyone knows, external objects have a tendency of getting misplaced and without his notebook Otto is no longer capable of reciting any knowledge with absolute certainty. In fact the only thing Otto can be certain of is the information exists somewhere in his notebook and that is… well… lost. This situation is quite a quagmire and doesn’t aid Otto’s case in any way.
Inga doesn’t encounter this problem because her memory exists internally. In fact, Inga could completely disregard the existence of her memory and it would still be present and functioning properly. The only occurrence Inga could experience that would equate to Otto misplacing his notebook is if she were to suffer some kind of head trauma and develop amnesia. In this case Inga couldn’t say that any of her beliefs or memories were true with certainty because she’d be relying on her damaged memory. Perhaps Inga should consider investing in a notebook!
In the end it is up to the individual to decide what is more important, functionality or physicality? However, I will always argue on the side of functionality. Otto’s notebook operates in an identical manner to Inga’s memory. Other than the difficulties that come with existing on an external plane, both objects are one and the same. As long as Otto’s notebook is with him and he continues to rely on it absolutely, it is worthy of being considered an extension of his cognitive system and is proof of the existence of an extended mind.
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